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A Community Tragedy: The Unmanaged
Water Commons in Southern Somalia
Adan Omar Hashi

I. Introduction
Water is the most crucial resource for virtually all aspects of human
existence. Humans are overwhelmingly dependent on it for economic
development, environmental survival, food security, and societal wellbeing. In 1998, the United Nations identified that scarcity of freshwater is one of the biggest problems facing humanity. According to
UNESCO, by 2050, two billion people will suffer from water scarcity.1
In Somalia, water insufficiency has already reached an alarming point:
less than 35% of the Somali people have access to clean water and
for rural communities the number spirals to almost zero. Because of
the water scarcity, conflicts are becoming more frequent in southern
Somalia. Traditionally, such conflicts were socially defined and acceptable ways of negotiating were implemented. However, many people
in Somalia, and more commonly in the southern regions, have lately
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turned a blind eye to the traditionally based system, and mechanisms
of force have become the social norm.
The term “commons” can be traced back to the Justinian code of
530 AD, issued by the Roman emperor Justinian, which recognized
resources, such as the air, sea, and running water, as “res communes
omnium” (things held in common). Such resources belong to everyone
and therefore cannot be owned by the private sector or the state. In
1215, the English King John signed the Magna Carta and in 1217, the
Charter of the Forest. Both documents defined, for the first time, what
is called the commons.2 Studies of the commons emerged in the 1970s.
The commons are a collective inheritance; they are not just resources,
but also the rich source of relationships between ordinary people and
communities that work together on shared purposes.
In the academic world, scholars have introduced different concepts
that explain the problems of the commons and proposed solutions
that can be used to solve these problems. Hardin’s 1968 concept of
“the tragedy of the commons” asserts that the core reasons behind the
problems of the commons are purely internal and that the solution is
through privatization and centralization. In contrast, in 1990, Ostrom
observed that many commons throughout the world pool resources.
He argues that since a number of them are governed by common property regimes, privatization would not be the solution to the problems.
The focus of this brief article is to comment on the causes of conflict
over the commonly owned water resources in southern Somalia. The
aim is not to present a new approach, but rather to dissect and better
comprehend the conceptual and contextual debates surrounding the
topic and assess their relevance in the southern Somalia case. The first
section reviews the internal factors and conflicts over common-pool
resources. The second section deals with the external issues and their
influence over the problems of the commons. The third part proposes
methods that might help contain such conflicts and better manage the
communally owned water resources.
II. Inter-Group Conflicts over Common-Pool Resources
The common-pool resource concept, which refers to a communally
owned resource, has nowadays been more generally acknowledged
than in the past. Bromley contributes to the common-pool literature by
defining the common property regime, which enables the owner of the
resources to exclude non-owners from using the resources, while at the
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same time giving co-owners rights and responsibilities with respect
to resource use rates.3 Causes of problems in the use, governance, and
sustainability of a commons can be said to be human behaviors that
often lead to social dilemmas, like competition for use, freeloading,
and overharvesting.4
According to Ostrom in 2005, a common-pool resource has two
elements: excludability, which is associated with the difficulty of
excluding users from appropriating a benefit from the resource; and
subtractability, as a user appropriating benefits would reduce the availability of the resource units to other beneficiaries.5 Bodies of water,
such as rivers and groundwater, are typical examples of common-pool
resources. Prohibiting water users from withdrawing water is very difficult. Because a user’s withdrawal of the resource limits the chances of
usage by others, an externality problem arises.6
Southern Somalia has in the past two decades experienced intense
conflict over common-pool resources. Although the prime cause of
such conflicts could be due to the changing climate, there are also
other elements, like social and political aspects, which are also important. Conventional solutions to the problems of the commons normally
involve centralization or privatization of the resources. Hardin’s use of
the tragedy of the commons concept has proved to be a useful starting point for figuring out how the commons have come to the brink of
environmental collapse. According to Hardin, commoners face a number of problems created not by malicious outside forces, but rather by
their innocent individualistic behavior. In the case of Somalia, Hardin’s
solution of centralized regulation and management, as well as full private ownership of common-pool resources, is actually the cause of the
tragedy. The conventional theory failed to predict when government
ownership would perform appropriately and how privatization would
improve outcomes. Ostrom, who conducted much empirical research
of common property systems in many different parts of the world, has
challenged Hardin’s concept. He argues that Hardin confused it with
open access, where no rules exist to limit entry and use. Ostrom introduced eight design principles that can be used to examine whether
commoners are managing the common-pool resource effectively.7 The
article will call upon Ostrom’s design of durable cooperative institutions, organized by commoners. The design principles are as follows:
1. Defined boundaries
2. Governing resources
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Collective-choice arrangements
Monitoring mechanisms
Graduated sanctions
Conflict resolutions
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
Nested enterprises

The first design principle, clearly defined boundaries, requires cogent
definition of not just the physical boundaries of the resource, but also
precision on the type of groups that have rights over the use of the
resources.8 Physical boundaries on resources in southern Somalia are
often not clearly delimited because resource users come from different parts of the country and are not limited to just the resident group.
In addition, there is overlapping use of the same resource by different
social and kin-based ethnic groups.
In Somalia, the Xeer traditional legal system was used to manage the
common-pool resources.9 Herders with their cattle and camels moved
long distances in search of grazing land and water. Preventing migrating pastoralists from using the communally owned resources was difficult. However, this was not considered to be a problem as long as
the newcomers did not claim ownership and as long as they gained
permission.10 Yet because there are no clear and unambiguous rules
about the use of water, haphazard conflicts are becoming more common. Such conflicts occur between pastoral communities, and between
pastoral and local agriculturalist communities.11 Because of poorly
defined boundaries in southern Somalia, the commoners are considered to be less successful in using the design principles approach.
The second principle governing resource use requires that the
contribution of labor, money, and materials suits the local situation.
Qaaraan, which serves as a social safety net, were collected from every
member of the clan or resource user, and workforces were mobilized
to better maintain the resource.12 In some parts of southern Somalia,
like Lower Shabelle, new users of a war, an unlined dug-out dam usually two to three meters deep, are required to take out buckets of mud
before being permitted to utilize it. This is because the bigger the war,
the more water it can accommodate during the rainy season. Lately,
however, people have been more determined to capture benefits from
the commons than to fulfil their duties.13
The third principle, collective-choice arrangements, gives those with
the right to participate power in modifying the rules.14 Shir is an infor-
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mal meeting of all the affected groups. It is where they discuss their
opinions and concerns and is the specific stipulation of Xeer.15 In southern Somalia, Xeer is not universalistic. Although there are rules that are
common to all Somali clans, like the payment of Diya, Xeer is specific to
the relationship between any two kin-groups. Different rules exist for
different communities, like agriculturalists and pastoralists.
Monitoring is the fourth design principle and helps control the
common-pool resource appropriation. Despite the rules and user participation in the decision-making process, there is often the temptation to cheat. Monitoring ensures the cheater will be observed and
held accountable.16 In southern Somalia, the communally owned water
resources are often poorly monitored.
The graduated sanctions design principle deals with the punishment of violators. In southern Somalia, like other regions, an individual is insured under the law against his or her liabilities by next of kin,
and victims are often given Diya.17
Conflict resolution mechanisms exist because even when commoners design and modify rules together, different interpretations may
occur. Therefore, before disagreement threatens the functioning system, there is a need for low cost and readily accessible arenas in which
to mediate and reach resolution among the users.18
Somalis have long used Xeer, which is an unwritten social contract,
to resolve conflicts. New systems of Xeer rules were continuously
developed to address unforeseen problems. The aggrieved group
might favor negotiation under the auspices of a Guurti or an Ergo,
which is a group of mediators that is often established to mediate
between both groups without becoming personally involved in the disputed subject matter. If both parties fail to reach an agreement, a jury
known as Xeerbeegti could be established to reach a solution, and both
parties are expected to embrace the verdict.19
To achieve Xeer, both parties must be happy with the Ergo or Xeerbeegti members. Negotiation is also expected to take place in a neutral
venue. Each clan, sub-kin, or sub-sub-relatives select a cohort known
as Nabadoono (sub-kin elders) that represents the kin group when dealing with others. The Nabadoono’s main task involves the management
and supervision of the daily business matters of the kin group.20 These
elders often deal with conflicts among various identities or negotiations with other groups. However today, Xeer is poorly managed.
Because of the introduction of sophisticated weapons of war, conflicts
now often take days, if not weeks and months, to settle.
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The last two design principles, minimal recognition of rights to
organize and nested enterprises, do not exist in southern Somalia. Both
principles require external government authorities giving rights to the
common-pool regimes, which the overthrown government denied. For
large systems the design principles are organized into multiple layers
of nested enterprises.21
III. Beyond the Internal Conflict over the
Common Pool of Resources
In addition to these eight principles in the case of southern Somalia,
one more issue needs to be examined: the external factors. Both Hardin
and Ostrom missed considering the external elements and their influence over the problems of the commons. This is a major shortcoming.
Hardin states that the problems of the commons are purely internal.
He proposes privatization, which consequently proposes a neo-liberal
Washington consensus ideology of the free market, and centralization,
which in the case of Somalia is the actual cause of the tragedy. The core
reasons why there has been a lack of governance over the commonpool resources include a disorganizing colonial intervention, a later
attempt at nationalization of the commons compounded by the violent
overthrow of Siyad Barre’s government, and a desire to reduce the
positive influence of the country’s kin-group tradition.22
Throughout the colonial period, Somalia was divided into two separate parts: the Italian region in the southern areas and the British in
the northern territory. The Italians appointed chiefs for each kin-group
to better manage their administrations.23 Because of the introduction
of this system, competition among kin-groups became frequent and
elders started competing for political appointment as a chief. The
colonialists used this policy to weaken the integrity of the communal
tradition and decision-making, which was crucial to governance and
forestalling the onset of conflict.24 Moreover, the Italians introduced
discriminatory laws that undermined the Xeer and further degraded
the status of Somalis.25
During the decades of the Cold War, most African countries sided
with either the communist or the capitalist ideology. With the military
takeover, Somalia threw in its lot with the statist ideology and introduced a new framework, different from the traditionally based one,
known as the Hantiwadag. It essentially means the common ownership
of assets. It is a literal approximation of “scientific socialism.”26
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By October 21, 1970, General Siyad Barre had proclaimed the
embrace of “scientific socialism” and ordained that all resources
would be nationalized. He believed that by using this new model of
organizing material life, the nation of nomads could be turned into
a modern socialist state in which communities would become free of
the liabilities of sectarian identities and move on to become citizens
aligned with the new ideology of the state. From there, the state would
offer more effective types of governance, leadership, greater security,
and welfare.27 The main ideological objective of the government was
to modernize, if not replace altogether, the Xeer and kinship systems,
which had laid out the link between the individual and group in Somalia for centuries.
There were two problems with this new model. First, the introduced
model did not fit with Somali concepts. Here, kinship systems and
Islamic conviction ran deep and therefore could not be easily supplanted. In fact, despite the governmental insistence on the elimination of the kin-based system and mentality, people still used the term
“MOD” when referring to Barre’s government. It stands for Mariixaan (Barre’s kin community), Ogaadeen (Barre’s mother’s group), and
Dhulbahantej (the community that Barre’s son-in-law hailed from).28
For many observers, these three kin-groups were the backbone of
the government’s inner circle. Due to the onerous implications of the
imposed statist policies, combined with the free-for-all (Hantiwadag)
that replaced the commons regime, commoners insisted on regaining
their Xeer system. This is the reason for the murderous chaos that now
bedevils the country.
The new generations that grew up under the collapsed regime had
little knowledge of the traditions that were deployed by their ancestors. As a result of this void, merchants of war emerged. These groups
use tactics of divide-and-rule among the elders to achieve their own
malignant interests. Because of disintegration and distrust within the
main kin relationships everywhere, smaller sub-kin started to identify
their own leaders, which increased tensions between clans and subclans. Traditionally, elders have used their powers to maintain peace
and co-existence within the community and to resolve local problems.
However, after the collapse of the state, elders started to mobilize their
own kin groups to fight with “others,” and siding with their kin even if
they were the aggressors.29
According to Dietz and colleagues, as history records, commoners
go through a process of comedy and tragedy during upheavals. The
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point is that issues relating to the problems of the commons do not
necessarily lead to tragedy, but can also lead to drama with a happy
ending.30 Before the colonial period, elders and their congeries had, to
some degree, successfully managed to maintain the effectiveness of the
common-pool resources by using the customary law, but have failed to
do so recently.31 Southern Somalia has not experienced Ostrom’s drama
of the commons model, but rather an endless series of breakdowns.
As stated by Caffentzis, there is no logical reason why communities
that have successfully been managing common-pool resources for generations (like water in southern Somalia before the colonial period) to
suddenly falter even though they have, at times, managed to solve the
coordination problems.32 Ostrom’s perspective fails to include within
the eight design principles external factors that can be the causes of
conflagration. In Somalia, the external factors of colonialism, “scientific socialism,” and civil war weakened the functionality of Xeer and
common-pool assets.
IV. Managing Tragedies
There is no blueprint solution to the water problems in southern Somalia. However, understanding links between external and internal is
crucially important. These reflections recommend further research on
an external-internal approach that combines the eight design principles with external factors, such as the civil war, so as to achieve a more
effective and collective management system.
Based on the preliminary explorations, the Rowland-Ostrom Framework, which provides two-step solutions to resource management
problems, is relevant to this particular outlined problem. The first step
of the framework deals with the identification of the problem that
threatens both the resource and the users. This examination identifies
the water crisis in southern Somalia as a state of acute urgency. The
most difficult issue with the first point is for the commoners of the
common-pool resources to acknowledge that a crisis situation exists.
After such a recognition, commoners could work toward reaching an
agreement so as to better sustain the resource for their mutual benefit.33 There is little doubt, then, that the water crisis in southern Somalia is interconnected with droughts, civil war, and the lack of effective
management.
With respect to the supervision of common-pool resources, resident users often possess inadequate scientific knowledge to com-
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plement their own indigenous knowledge. Reliable information on
water conditions and the effects of water use patterns are important
for the long-term management of common-pool resources.34 The current government can help local users by conducting environmental
assessments of water use patterns and identifying areas that are being
degraded or at risk, while also providing training to the local communities in improved management techniques. The current government
has an important role to play in resolving disputes, reconciling the
different user groups, monitoring the implementation of resource use
agreements by providing a legal framework worked out by different
local groups, providing technical and management support for local
communities, and carrying out environmental assessments. Considering these various issues, it can be clearly said that the state has a
continuing and facilitative role to play in the management of commonpool resources.35
The second step of the Rowland-Ostrom Framework requires transitioning from the existing water management system to a protocol
using a common-pool resource system, which follows from Ostrom’s
eight principles. Once a common-pool resource management system is
in place, water disputes can be prevented more successfully.36 In order
to address southern Somalia’s unprecedented water crisis, Somalia
desperately needs to find long-lasting solutions to the ongoing political conflict. Without dealing with the external factors, which both Hardin and Ostrom failed to acknowledge, an effective water management
system cannot be implemented. The argument is that in the case of
southern Somalia, both external and internal factors are interdependent.
Apart from the government acting as a facilitator, social charters
can be used as a mechanism for governing the commons. They specify
the groups that have access to the resource, control over the use of the
resource, and, if there are fees, how the wealth and costs are distributed
among the group.37 Therefore, each community creates social charters,
rather than leaving all the responsibilities for the state bureaucracy.
This would create common trust, which ensures the health and wellbeing of the communal assets for generations to come.
This assessment acknowledges that the external-internal approach
is not the only way to address water use issues in southern Somalia.
Though one specific approach cannot be a panacea to better manage
problems over the use of water, examining the effect of a specific combination of tools is wise in order to prevent harmful consequences.
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V. Conclusion
In Somalia, water scarcity has been brewing for some time and has
reached an alarming point, severely impacting the country’s social,
economic, political, and environmental well-being, and leading to
ongoing conflicts among commoners. Traditionally, conflicts over
common-pool resources were socially defined and acceptable ways of
negotiating were implemented. Lately, however, people have turned
a blind eye to the traditionally based system, and force has become
the social norm. This is because of the colonial anti-customary-law
movement and the late Barre’s governmental nationalization of the
communally owned range, which negated the laws devised by communities. Droughts, the growing demand for basic resources, political
conflicts and civil war, and mismanagement have, combined, escalated hostilities and subsequent conflicts. While prominent scholars
have long interrogated such disputes and provided good models, their
studies lack an appreciation of the impact of decisive external factors
that, in the case of southern Somalia, had fuelled the problems that are
destroying common-pool resources. Thus, further work on this point is
now necessary. As for the current authorities in Mogadishu, an attempt
to minimize the destabilization of the country and Xeer-cum-kinship
systems might prove to be worthy of serious effort. In this context, the
state can act as a facilitator in the revival and monitoring of resourceuse agreements reached by different local groups. Rather than the
failed policy of tight centralization, commoners could now be empowered to be creative in establishing durable trust and fairness that could
preempt possible disharmonies among communities. This is a drastically different future for the coming generations than the bloody mess
of the past five decades.
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